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Further Thoughts on the Brazilian Grain Market,  
Its Competitiveness and Its Challenges 
In previous articles in this space (on 6/20/2018 and 
6/19/2019), I talked about recent developments and 
challenges for Brazilian grain markets. We discussed 
that one of the main obstacles for Brazilian competi-
tiveness is the country’s logistics system. In those 
articles, we focused more on transportation and 
how higher marketing costs are explained by the 
poor infrastructure in Brazil and the modes of 
transportation used to haul grain to export ports. 
Today we will talk a bit more about this point, and 
then address another dimension of the logistics 
challenge in Brazil. 
As previously discussed, the major agricultural area 
in Brazil is the center-west region, while the new 
frontier that has been expanding in recent years is 
the Matopiba region in the Brazilian northeast 
(Figure 1). One of the greatest challenges in these 
areas is transportation. Traditionally, Brazilian grain 
is exported through ports in the south and south-
east, which are located around 1,000 miles from 
those regions. Still, approximately 75-80% of Brazil-
ian grain is exported through these ports in the 
south and southeast. In addition, grain from the 
center-west and Matopiba is mainly transported by 
trucks, which is typically more expensive than rail 
or barges. 
The distance to the ports and the relatively more 
expensive mode of transportation has decreased the 
competitiveness of Brazilian grain in the world mar-
ket. In order to improve competitiveness, Brazil has 
been working on expanding the capacity of ports 
located in the north and developing cheaper and 
more efficient modes of transportation (i.e. rail and 
barges) to haul grain to the northern ports. Nowa-
days, around 20-25% of Brazilian grain is shipped 
through the northern ports. The Brazilian govern- 
Market Report  Year 
Ago  4 Wks Ago  11-15-19 
Livestock and Products, 
Weekly Average    
No re-
port – 
Thanks-
giving 
Week 
*  * 
Nebraska Slaughter Steers, 
35-65% Choice, Live Weight. . . . . . .  156.18  157.55 
Nebraska Feeder Steers, 
Med. & Large Frame, 550-600 lb. . . . .  150.88  158.02 
Nebraska Feeder Steers, 
Med. & Large Frame 750-800 lb. . .. .  217.93  240.66 
Choice Boxed Beef, 
600-750 lb. Carcass. . . . . . . . . . . . . .  *  * 
Western Corn Belt Base Hog Price 
Carcass, Negotiated . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..  76.74  87.28 
Pork Carcass Cutout, 185 lb. Carcass 
51-52% Lean. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  149.15  152.16 
Slaughter Lambs, wooled and shorn, 
135-165 lb. National. . . . . . .  403.37  402.34 
National Carcass Lamb Cutout 
FOB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .       
Crops, 
Daily Spot Prices       
Wheat, No. 1, H.W. 
Imperial, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3.74  3.67 
Corn, No. 2, Yellow 
Columbus, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3.74  3.51 
Soybeans, No. 1, Yellow 
Columbus, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .  8.41  8.16 
Grain Sorghum, No.2, Yellow 
Dorchester, cwt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6.02  5.77 
Oats, No. 2, Heavy 
Minneapolis, Mn, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3.09  3.15 
Feed       
Alfalfa, Large Square Bales, 
Good to Premium, RFV 160-185 
Northeast Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . .  *  175.25 
Alfalfa, Large Rounds, Good 
Platte Valley, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  107.50  107.50 
Grass Hay, Large Rounds, Good 
 Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .  95.00  95.00 
Dried Distillers Grains, 10% Moisture 
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  147.50  153.00 
Wet Distillers Grains, 65-70% Moisture 
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  52.50  52.50 
 ⃰ No Market          
Figure 1: Agricultural areas in Brazil – Center-west (left) and Matopiba (right) 
ment plans to expand this number to 40% by 2025. Trans-
portation costs could be reduced since these ports in the 
north are geographically closer to the center-west and Ma-
topiba. Besides, they would be accessed more easily by 
cheaper modes of transportation (rail and barges). 
A study by the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corpora-
tion (EMBRAPA) discusses calculations of the cost of Bra-
zilian grain to buyers in China and Europe. The numbers 
indicate that shipping grain to these regions from the Bra-
zilian center-west through the northern ports can already 
be about 20% cheaper than shipping it through the south-
ern ports. Besides, improving the ability to haul the grain 
from the center-west and Matopiba to the northern ports 
by rail or barges can further decrease this cost by 16-20%. 
Therefore, shipping more grain through the northern ports 
and improving the modes of transportation to reach those 
ports can potentially make Brazilian grain more competi-
tive in the world market. 
However, there is another dimension of the logistics sys-
tem that also affects the competitiveness of Brazilian grain, 
which is the deficit in storage capacity. An increasingly 
larger portion of the Brazilian grain crop cannot be stored 
because its volume exceeds storage capacity in the country. 
The lack of storage forces producers to sell their grain fast-
er, soon after harvest. The larger amount of grain to be 
hauled at that time means higher transportation costs, 
which affects the competitiveness of Brazilian grain as well 
as the profits of producers. In addition, the large amount of 
grain hauled to the ports at the same time also creates an-
other problem for the logistics system which is the rising 
waiting time to unload the grain at the port. At harvest  
time, ports are so busy that it is not unusual to arrive at 
the port and then wait for several days until the grain 
can be unloaded, which adds to the cost of shipping 
Brazilian grain to the world market and hence reduces 
its competitiveness. 
This issue has become more relevant in recent years 
because grain production started increasing faster than 
storage capacity. Storage capacity in Brazil has in-
creased from 88 million tons in 2000 to 166 million 
tons in 2018, i.e. an increase of 88% in 18 years (or an 
average increase of 3.6% per year). However, grain pro-
duction in Brazil has increased faster during the same 
period, going from 83 million tons in 2000 to 229 mil-
lion tons in 2018. This represents a total increase of 
176% or an average increase of 5.8% per year (Figure 
2). 
Since grain production has been increasing faster than 
storage capacity, there has been a growing storage defi-
cit (grain production minus storage capacity) in Brazil. 
In the early 2000’s, the deficit was around 10-20 million 
tons, i.e. around 10% of Brazilian grain production 
could not be stored. In recent years, the deficit has 
grown to 40-60 million tons, which means that approx-
imately 20-30% of Brazilian grain production cannot 
be stored because it exceeds storage capacity (Figures 3 
and 4). In particular, the deficit is generally larger in 
the center-west region and Matopiba. In the last few 
years, storage capacity has corresponded to 50-55% of 
total grain production in these areas. Not only is there 
an increasing deficit in grain storage in Brazil, but also 
this issue is more serious in two of the most important 
agricultural areas in the country  
Source: Data from CONAB1 
Figure 2: Grain production and storage capacity in Brazil – 2000 to 2018 
(million tons) 
Source: Data from CONAB 
Figure 3: Storage capacity deficit (grain production minus storage capacity) in 
Brazil – 2000 to 2018 (million tons) 
___________________________ 
1  CONAB (Brazilian Food Supply Company) is a public agency under the Brazilian Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock 
and Supply (MAPA), responsible for the execution of Brazilian agricultural policies related to price support, public 
storage, market supply and foreign trade. In addition, CONAB participates in the formulation of Brazilian government 
agricultural policy. 
Source: Data from CONAB 
Figure 4: Proportion of grain production in Brazil that exceeds storage capacity – 
2000 to 2018 
The two points discussed here illustrate some of the chal-
lenges faced by Brazil to improve the competitiveness of its 
grain in the world market. More data needs to be collected 
and more research needs to be done to assess the real com-
petitive advantage that Brazil may earn if the northern 
ports become more active and storage capacity in the coun-
try increases. Basically, what is needed to accomplish these 
goals is capital and a business plan. Brazil has historically 
performed poorly when it comes to investments in infra-
structure and development of solid business plans, particu-
larly when the government is involved. However, there 
have been improvements in the recent past, hence it is 
worth watching closely how this story develops because it 
has the potential to change the world grain market in the 
future. 
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